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AbsTrACT
Care during mass casualty events (MCE) has 
improved during the last 15 years. Military and civilian 
collaboration has led to partnerships which augment 
the response to MCE. Much has been written about 
strategies to deliver care during an MCE, but there is 
little about how to transition back to normal operations 
after an event. A panel discussion entitled The Day(s) 
After: Lessons Learned from Trauma Team Management 
in the Aftermath of an Unexpected Mass Casualty Event 
at the 76th Annual American Association for the Surgery 
of Trauma meeting on September 13, 2017 brought 
together a cadre of military and civilian surgeons with 
experience in MCEs. The events described were the 
First Battle of Mogadishu (1993), the Second Battle of 
Fallujah (2004), the Bagram Detention Center Rocket 
Attack (2014), the Boston Marathon Bombing (2013), 
the Asiana Flight 214 Plane Crash (2013), the Baltimore 
Riots (2015), and the Orlando Pulse Night Club Shooting 
(2016). This article focuses on the lessons learned from 
military and civilian surgeons in the days after MCEs.
InTroduCTIon
The last 15 years of war have advanced care 
after mass casualty events (MCEs), dramatically 
improving patient survival.1 As such, lessons 
borrowed from the military have been applied to 
domestic healthcare. Partnerships have formed, 
with a combined military–civilian response to 
Hurricane Harvey, a train derailment in Tacoma, 
Washington, and the Las Vegas massacre.2 3
To expand on this theme, the American Associ-
ation for the Surgery of Trauma (AAST) assembled 
a cadre of military and civilian physicians with 
experience in mass casualty trauma care to facili-
tate domestic preparedness for the next MCE. The 
speakers described their experience dealing with 
multiple casualties and strategies to handle the 
aftermath after the initial surge as they transitioned 
their hospitals to normal operation. Whereas much 
has been written about delivering care during an 
MCE, the focus of this article is to highlight shared 
strategies to deal with the aftermath of MCEs. The 
content of this article is drawn from the lessons 
learned after MCEs in military and civilian health-
care settings.
MeThods
A qualitative theme array analysis was performed 
by two independent reviewers present for the 
panel discussion entitled The Day(s) After: Lessons 
Learned from Trauma Team Management in the 
Aftermath of an Unexpected Mass Casualty Event 
hosted by the Military Liaison Committee at the 
76th Annual AAST meeting in Baltimore, Mary-
land, on September 13, 2017. Relevant themes 
were organized into categories. Areas of consensus 
were used to generate this article. The article was 
reviewed by the panelists to ensure their thoughts 
and descriptions were captured and depicted 
correctly.
event descriptions
A summary of the MCEs described in the session 
can be found in table 1.
The First battle of Mogadishu, october 3–4, 1993
A US Army surgeon described his experience caring 
for injured soldiers during the First Battle of Moga-
dishu. In the events made famous by the book Black 
Hawk Down, 19 US soldiers were killed and 73 
wounded in action in an overnight combat opera-
tion.4 With some personnel trapped by surrounding 
hostile combatants, medical care was initially deliv-
ered while under fire. Faced with several heavily 
injured soldiers and few resources, the panelist 
described lessons learned from simultaneously 
caring for patients and ensuring the safety of the 
healthcare team.
operation Phantom Fury, the second battle of 
Fallujah, november 7–10, 2004
A US Air Force surgeon described caring for the 
injured transported to the theater evacuation hub 
during Operation Phantom Fury (OPF), the Second 
Battle of Fallujah, the bloodiest battle of the Iraq 
War. Coalition forces suffered 107 killed and 613 
wounded in action over a period of 4 days. More 
than 200 required hospital treatment, with 191 
operations performed.
bagram detention Center rocket Attack, october 
31, 2014
Another US Air Force surgeon described the events 
of October 31, 2014, in which 26 prisoners were 
injured in a rocket attack on Bagram detention 
facility. Healthcare providers were tasked with 
caring for detainees while under rocket attack. He 
described managing the logistical, ethical, and secu-
rity concerns shared by his medical team as they 
cared for the injured.
boston Marathon bombing, April 15, 2013
A trauma surgeon at Massachusetts General 
Hospital (MGH) recounted delivering care to civil-
ians dismembered when two homemade bombs 
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Table 1 Description of mass casualty events presented at the panel discussion entitled The Day(s) After: Lessons Learned from Trauma Team 
Management in the Aftermath of an Unexpected Mass Casualty Event hosted by the Military Liaison Committee at the 76th Annual American 
Association for the Surgery of Trauma meeting in Baltimore, Maryland, on September 13, 2017
event Location date(s) Military/Civilian
The First Battle of Mogadishu Mogadishu, Somalia October 3–4, 1993 Military
Operation Phantom Fury, the Second Battle of Fallujah Fallujah, Iraq November 7–10, 2004 Military
Bagram Detention Center Rocket Attack Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan October 31, 2014 Military
Boston Marathon Bombing Boston, Massachusetts April 15, 2013 Civilian
Asiana Flight 214 Plane Crash San Francisco, California July 6, 2013 Civilian
Baltimore Riots Baltimore, Maryland April 18–May 3, 2015 Civilian
Orlando Pulse Night Club Orlando, Florida June 12, 2016 Civilian
box 1 Common themes identified in responses to 
military and civilian mass casualty events as described by 
the panelists
 ► Assume non-traditional duties.
 ► Make space by any means necessary.
 ► Revisit, review, retriage.
 ► Plan to deal with the media.
 ► Take care of hospital staff.
were detonated near the finish line of the annual Boston Mara-
thon, which killed 3 and injured 243. The panelist described 
facilitating care of the injured at an experienced trauma center 
having all hands on deck during change of shift.
Asiana Flight 214 Plane Crash, July 6, 2013
On July 6, 2013, Asiana Airlines Flight 214, a transpacific 
passenger flight carrying 307 individuals from Seoul, South 
Korea, crashed on final approach at the San Francisco Interna-
tional Airport. Three individuals were killed in the crash and 
187 passengers were injured, 49 seriously. A trauma surgeon 
from the San Francisco General Hospital described the chal-
lenges of caring for a multitude of seriously injured, unidenti-
fied, non-English-speaking minors in the midst of international 
media attention.
baltimore riots, April 18–May 3, 2015
Following the death of Freddy Gray, a 25-year-old African–Amer-
ican man who died while in police custody, a series of riots broke 
out in Baltimore, Maryland. A trauma surgeon at the University 
of Maryland’s Shock Trauma Center described his experience 
caring for people injured in the riots as violence escalated in the 
streets around the hospital. The panelist discussed the challenges 
faced by healthcare providers sequestered at the hospital, sepa-
rated from their families, for days during the pinnacle of riots.
orlando Pulse night Club shooting, June 12, 2016
On June 12, 2016, a shooter killed 49 people and wounded 
58 others in an attack inside the Pulse Night Club in Orlando, 
Florida. Only blocks away from Orlando Regional Medical 
Center (ORMC), a trauma surgeon described his experience 
providing care to injured patients who arrived in minutes, some-
times carried in on foot. With the threat of an active shooter and 
a surge of critically injured patients arriving without notice, the 
hospital’s resources were quickly stretched to the limit.
resuLTs
We identified five themes common to all MCE responses. A 
summary of these themes can be found in box 1 and are described 
as follows:
Assume non-traditional duties
Delegation of tasks is key to maintaining quality care during 
a surge and returning to normal functions promptly. When 
resources are stretched thin, delegation may require assigning 
personnel to tasks that are outside the scope of their typical duties. 
In Mogadishu, more than 200 casualties arrived at the hospital 
during a time when staffing was already short due to a reduction 
of hospital personnel. As such, administrative nurses assumed 
clinical duties and medics moved from the prehospital to the 
inpatient setting to assist with patient care. In OPF, non-medical 
personnel assisted with patient movement and stocking supplies. 
Physicians applied their skills in non-traditional roles, such as 
the urologist who served as an operative assistant to the trauma 
surgeon and performed wound care duties. At Bagram, when the 
initial surge ended, trauma surgeons cleaned floors and adminis-
trative staff rounded to identify patients ready for discharge. In 
Baltimore, administrative assistants functioned as communica-
tion liaisons during the riots. Flexibility in assignments and the 
willingness of staff to perform whatever tasks were necessary, 
regardless of their usual duties, were noted by all panelists as 
essential components of MCE management.
Make and maintain clinical capacity by any means necessary
To make the most of limited clinical capacity, all speakers 
emphasized the importance of canceling non-essential opera-
tions, promptly discharging eligible patients, and repurposing 
existing spaces into extended patient care areas. Outdoor areas 
were used for triage and treatment when additional emergency 
room space was required. To expand the capabilities of caring 
for those with critical injuries, rooms in the emergency depart-
ment and/or postanesthesia care unit were used as additional 
intensive care unit (ICU) beds. During OPF, a pulmonary crit-
ical care intensivist was assigned as the triage officer to facili-
tate allocation and utilization of these impromptu ICU beds. In 
Baltimore extra equipment and supplies were mobilized from 
throughout the hospital and prehospital areas to create extra 
ICU areas. Anticipating the need for delayed second-look oper-
ations was essential. In Orlando, two operating rooms were set 
aside the following day for such operations. Discharge teams 
were assembled in Iraq, Baltimore, and San Francisco to facili-
tate and expedite patient throughput. Anticipating the need for 
physical therapy and rehabilitation assessment needs allowed 
San Francisco to plan for additional staffing and to facilitate 
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early postdischarge needs planning. When able, some hospitals 
diverted non-MCE-related patients to other medical centers.
revisit, review, retriage
In the midst of surge, there is a huge workload with arrival of the 
initial wave of casualties. The focus of patient care is on imme-
diate lifesaving interventions, which frequently means non-ur-
gent details, documentation, and careful tertiary examinations 
are initially lacking. The team in OPF identified the need to 
revisit initial decisions, avoid assumptions, and not take anything 
for granted. Reviewing and repeating imaging was required to 
ensure nothing was missed by hasty initial readings or incom-
plete initial imaging. With large numbers of patients and espe-
cially with unusual mechanisms such as a plane crash, liberal use 
of imaging should be encouraged.5 Consolidating documentation 
and completing details that were missing were helpful to estab-
lish continuity as care continued forward. Repeated head to toe 
examinations, including examination of tympanic membranes 
and teeth, revealed initially missed injuries. Searching for 
retained objects in previously closed wounds and ensuring that 
hastily closed incisions were revised so that traumatic wounds 
were washed and closed in layers were done within the first 48 
hours. Changing lines placed emergently, placing feed tubes, and 
assessing venous thromboembolism risk were then completed 
to ensure quality care measures were met that might have been 
missed during the MCE surge. This strategy was essential to 
ensuring all 243 patients treated at the MGH after the Boston 
bombing left the hospital alive.6 In one case, review of a chest 
X-ray obtained on primary survey revealed fragments overlying 
the cardiac silhouette that had initially been missed. Careful 
interval review of all images initially read during the surge 
allowed this patient to receive potentially lifesaving care.
Plan to deal with the media
Particularly when the MCE took place on US soil, engaging 
with media was mentioned as a complicating factor in providing 
crisis patient care. In San Francisco and Orlando, hundreds of 
well-wishers, family members, and media arrived early after 
reports of the MCE hit the news. In Orlando and Baltimore, 
prominent politicians and celebrities arrived while patients care 
needs were still surging. These distractions can make caring for 
patients difficult and can distort public perceptions and violate 
patient confidentiality if not handled well. In San Francisco, the 
hospital leadership established regular conferences to engage 
with the press, created an official website, set up a call center 
with a hotline, and designated a separate family gathering area 
to help maintain control of what could otherwise have been a 
chaotic exchange of information. Regardless of the MCE, panel-
ists emphasized ensuring a unified hospital message and hospital 
staff guidance of how to handle potential impromptu interac-
tions with the media. Finally, talking first to patient families was 
essential to ensure information regarding their loved ones was 
conveyed from the hospital rather than through media outlets.
Take care of hospital staff
All the panelists emphasized taking care of medical staff as an 
essential part of maintaining quality patient care and being able 
to return to normal functions after an MCE. The physical and 
emotional toll of caring for injured patients in a crisis can drive 
healthcare workers to exhaustion. Thirty percent of the surgical 
residents who served at the ORMC during the Pulse Night Club 
Shooting experienced burnout, major depression, or post-trau-
matic stress disorder (PTSD) lasting 6 months after the crisis had 
ended.7 Similar instances of PTSD and fatigue were identified 
in Baltimore and were familiar concerns during the military 
MCEs. In instances in which the hospital staff were separated 
from their families and unable to return home, care providers 
faced additional stressors. The need to maintain a team fresh for 
assuming clinical duties meant forcing staff to sleep, eat, and rest 
even when they may be motivated to keep working. This fact 
held true for team leaders, including the panelists themselves, 
who found it difficult but necessary to designate and adhere to 
personal time limits and to delegate leadership responsibilities to 
others. Finally, ensuring the health and safety of personnel meant 
starting infectious disease testing and prophylaxis as necessary as 
needle sticks and exposure to blood and body fluids were ubiqui-
tous. The ORMC encouraged early psychological counseling for 
all staff who participated in caring for patients during the MCE.
ConCLusIons
Unfortunately, many medical centers have dealt with MCEs in 
recent years, allowing our medical response to these crises to 
improve with experience. Collaboration between military and 
civilian physicians with experience in treating victims of mass 
violence is an important step toward ensuring preparedness for 
the next MCE. Having an idea of what to expect and some strat-
egies to mitigate the challenges may hopefully help others when 
they are faced with dealing with similar tragedies.
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